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LEGAL THEORIES OF MONEY
PHANOR J. EDER
One of the penalties paid for the blessings of stability of the cur-
rency is that the law finds itself unprepared for unexpected and revo-
lutionary changes in the monetary system. Money constitutes the
most vital part of the substructure of the entire legal system, but
when its stability is taken for granted, monetary questions rarely
come before the courts and no analysis of underlying legal theories
becomes necessary.
In England and the United States, so far as we are informed, no
complete book has ever been published on the subject of the law of
money' and with the exception of the recent output of papers on the
gold clause only a few articles and chapters have appeared. These dis-
cuss isolated questions with especial emphasis on constitutional as-
pects. No attempt appears to have been made to correlate the special
topics to the much broader field of monetary legal theory.2 Lacking a
comprehensive treatment of the whole subject, not alone the bar and
the courts, but also the legislative and executive authorities may fall
into errors, of language at least, that may tend to distort in unex-
pected ways the whole legal structure. In view of recent legislation
and of the acute emphasis on monetary policies that always accom-
panies crises and depressions, a brief survey of the whole law of money
is deemed of interest.3
The first requisite for clear analysis is to sharply differentiate the
legal field from the economic and political fields. The methods of ap-
proach are necessarily different. It is no part of the ordinary duty
of the courts to examine controverted economic and political theories;
their decisions are based on precedents and experience, though the
economic and practical results of laying down rules for the future
cannot be wholly ignored. In discussing constitutional questions, it is
true, the field of examination is necessarily broader and in the inter-
pretation of statutes, the economic theories that underlie new legis-
'The second part of MALYNES, LEX MERCATORIA (1622), the'first English book
on the Law Merchant, is entitled "Money", but deals chiefly with matters now
assigned to other topics. LEADING CASES ON THE LAW OF MONEY was published
by J. J. CRANDELL, Camden, N. J. 1899. The Continental Literature is volum-
inous. The writer is especially indebted to Nussbaum, Ascarelli and Mater.
20liphant, Money (1920) 29 YALE L. J. 6o6 is a notable exception.
3"Money is an institution, not of one nation, but of the world, and the insti-
tution, in order to be understood, must be studied as a whole." HORTON, THE
POSITION OF LAW IN THE DOCTRINE OF MONEY (1882) 9.
52
LEGAL THEORIES OF MONEY
lation occasionally may have to be studied, but frequently such study
in view of the haziness of the ideas underlying emergency and political
legislation will be sterile. Modem economists, unlike the pioneers,
seem often to have lost touch with the day-to-day actualities of
monetary matters as they come up in legal practice and before the
courts. Hence it is, perhaps, and not because of any inherent con-
servatism that judges are more apt to be influenced by the views of
the older economists who, to them, seem more cognizant of daily legal
realities, than by present day theorists. In monetary matters es-
pecially, it is not to be expected that customs and traditions dating in
their origin to the dawn of history, crystallized and expanded through
the Renaissance development of the Roman law, the evolution of the
law merchant and its incorporation into the common law and finally
reshaped without perverting their fundamental content to meet
modem complex conditions of banking, trade, credit and industry,
will be lightly cast aside.
The history of the law of money evidences a constant struggle be-
tween the customs of trade and the doctrine of freedom of contract,
on the one hand, and on the other, the exercise of the political power
for the needs of the government or the relief of private debtors. Courts
and commentators have been influenced by this struggle in determin-
ing whether the intention of the parties to contracts should be en-
forced or the paramount fiat of the political authorities be mitigated
to avoid injustice. Nearly all the questions and theories of modem
days find their prototype in the discussions of early jurists. From
early days, the difficulties of the subject have been recognized.
Modem discussions turn rather on the application of old theories to
new conditions, such as inconvertible paper currency and bank or de-
posit money, than on the elaboration of new principles. The thread of
continuity in the law is strong. Cases seemingly possessing only an
historical interest suddenly are endowed with renewed life and in-
terest as the result of changing laws and conditions reproducing an-
alogous situations. Most of the fundamental notions were formulated
at an early date and still hold. Confusion it is true exists in the cases.
This is due in part to defective legislation, in part to ignoring dis-
tinctions long ago pointed out.
We cannot here review the history of legal theories in the light of
prevailing economic and political concepts and schools of jurispru-
dence.4 A fewhigh spots however stand out. Legal monetary doctrines
4For continental history ingeneral, see especially ASCARELLI, LA MONETA (1928),
and for France, MATER, TRAITA DE LA MONNAIE (1925). No similar research as
far as we are aware has been undertaken for England and the United States.
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played their part in the struggle against political autocracy. Early
writers among the Canon and Civil lawyers attempted to curb the
abuses of devaluation of the currency by princes, by formulating
the doctrine that debasement could only be effected cum assensu pop-
ui.5 Coke6 and Blackstone7 were of the opinion the King had no pre-
rogative to debase the currency. In practice, however, the sovereign
exercised this prerogative and with the growth of centralized auto-
cratic power beginning in the latter part of the ith Century on the
Continent and in England reaching its climax under the Tudors, con-
trol of the coinage became definitely unquestioned as a sovereign
prerogative. The domain of legal tender also in effect fell within
sovereign sway." Later as part of the ensuing struggle for civil and
political liberty, the principle of the sanctity of the mint weights of
the standard money became firmly established under the leadership
of John Locke, never to be again questioned9 until the year of grace
1933-
Clashing theories as to the legal nature of money were early de-
veloped and are still constantly echoed in discussion. Is the law to
treat money as having a real, intrinsic value, based ultimately on the
precious metals, which alone can serve as an international medium of
exchange? 0 In other words, is the mercantile view that money arises
spontaneously from use in trade and must be essentially cosmopolitan,
to be given full play, when not expressly barred by sovereign flat, or
is money, always and for all purposes, to be deemed merely an ideal
numerical unit created solely by action of the State, which declares
and maintains what its nominal value shall be?" English and Ameri-
5AscARELLI, LA MONETA, 12 seQ.
62 COKE, INST. 577, as cited and refuted by HALE, P. C. 194; and see 6 HALS-
BURY, LAWS Or ENGLAND (2d ed. 1932) § 688 (h.).
WVol. I, 278 (i4th Eng. ed.)
$Le Case de Mixt Moneys, Sir John Davies Rep. i8, 8o Eng. Rep. 507 (Eng. tr.
1762) 48 (I6o5) (The actual decision goes no further than to hold that an engage-
ment to pay current money in the future may be discharged by whatever has been
made lawful money at the date of maturity). HALE, P. C. 194; BRECKINRIDGE,
LEGAL TENDER (1903). The first express full legal tender statute in England was
not enacted until 1816.
9FEAVERYEAR, THE POUND STERLING 121, 136 seg. The reduction in the gold
content of the dollar in 1834was merely an attempt to maintain the market ratio
with silver, the then primary standard.
'
0HoRTON op. cit. supra note 3, at 32; dissenting judges in Legal Tender cases,
79 U. S. 457, 2o L. ed. 287 (1871).
nHoRTON op. cit. supra note 3, at 33. See argument of counsel in Hague v.
Powers, 39"Baib. (9. Y.) 427 (1863). The leading expositor on the Continent of a
moderate and rational "nominalism" is Nussbaum. The opposition to this theory
was never more eloquently stated than by Canning, in the debate (1811) on the
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can courts, wisely it seems to us, have abstained from completely
espousing either extreme.
These two contrasting theories, with modifications of varying
degrees of content and application, furnish some clue to the maze
of judicial language and thought, but a better approach towards har-
monizing, in part, conflicting decisions in our courts lies in an an-
alysis of the functions of money. Of the various functions of money
recognized by economists, the courts have heretofore been concerned
with only three:
i. Money as a medium of exchange.
2. Money as a measure of value or more accurately phrased
perhaps, as a common denominator of value.
3. Money as a medium of discharge or satisfaction of obli-
gations and specifically as a medium of payment of debts.
While in practice these three functions are often interwoven, they
are nevertheless, in law, separate and distinct and rules properly
applicable in the solution of problems under one function are not
necessarily valid for the other functions. Properly drafted legislation
should recognize the distinction between these three functions. Recent
legislation has not clearly done so and hence offers not only diffi-
culties of interpretation but also presents new constitutional and
legal problems.
MONEY AS MEDIUM OF EXCHANGE
A number of important legal doctrines flow from the function of
money as a medium of exchange or circulating medium. These are
concerned (a) with the title to money and the remedies for its re-
covery; and (b) with the validity or invalidity and effect of tran-
sactions based on current money.
Title to Money. In order to subserve its purpose as a medium of ex-
change, no question as to the title to or validity of the money given
in an exchange on an honestly consummated transaction should be
allowed to arise. If money could be followed up by the person from
whom it has been stolen as other personal property can be (with
certain exceptions) into the hands of a bona fide holder for value, and
reclaimed, no one would be safe in selling goods, no wage-earner could
safely receive his pay, no creditor could safely receive payment of his
debt, all the ordinary exchanges of a civilized community would come
Bullion Committee's Report. SUMNER, HISTORY OF AMERICAN CURRENCY (1874)
276, 277. It is refreshing to recall that in these debates on the Bullion Repert, it
was insisted that to use gold and silver was barbarous and behind the age. SUm-
NER, id. at 258.
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to a standstill. This then is the reason for the old doctrine of the com-
mon-law that "money has no earmark."' 2 The taker in good faith for
a valuable consideration of money that has been stolen," embezzled 4
or fraudulently obtained," acquires title to it." So, too, the ancient
rule that the finder of lost chattels has title against all the world ex-
cept the true owner is especially applicable to money. The general
rule as to lost chattels does not under some decisions include choses
in action, but bank notes are not considered for this purpose as
choses in action, but as money, passing as such from hand to hand
by delivery and circulating as a medium of exchange equally vith
coined money. The finder of lost money, as in the case of stolen
money, transmits a perfect title to a bona fide recipient for value.'7
22Miller v. Race, I Burr. 452, 97 Eng. Rep. 398 (2758); Moss v. Hancock,
[1899] 2 Q. B. III; Sinclair v. Brougham, [19141 A. C. 398; See Hatch v. Fourth
National Bank, 147 N. Y. 184, 191, 192, 41 N. E. 403, 404-405 (1895). For the
origin of the doctrine see 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HIST. OF ENG. LAW (1895)
149, 150.
1327 HALSBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND (1913) 902, 903; Moss v. Hancock, cited
supra note 12. The doctrine was extended from coined money to bank notes by
Lord Mansfield in the leading case of Miller v. Race, cited supra note 12, and has
been constantly applied ever since even against the issuing bank. Solomons v.
Bank of England, 13 East 255 n. IO4 Eng. Rep. 319 n. (179); Lowndes v. Ander-
son, 13 East I3O, io4 Eng. Rep. 317 (I8io); City Bank v. Farmers Bank, Fed.
Cas. No. 2738 (1847); Worcester Bank v. Dorchester & M. Bank, 64 Mass. 488,
57 Am. Dec. 120 (1852); Wyer v. Dorchester & M. Bank, 65 Mass. 51, 59 Am.
Dec. 137 (1853); Pelletierv. State National Bank, 114 La. 174,38 So. 112 (1905).
But see: Sylvester v. Girard, 4 Rawle (Pa.) 185 (1833). The doctrine applies to
checks. Hatch v. Fourth National Bank, cited supra note 22.
14Merchants Loan & Trust Co. v. Lamson, 9o Ill. App. I8 (i899); First Na-
tional Bank v. Gibert, 123 La. 845, 49 So. 593 (i909); see Newell v. Hadley, 206
Mass. 335,92 N.E. 507,29 L. R. A. (N. S.) 9o8,916 (IgIO).
'sState Bank v. United States, 114 U. S. 401, 5 Sup. Ct. 888, 29 L. ed. 149
(1885); Merchants Loan & Trust Co. v. Lamson, supra note i4; Ball v. Shepard,
202 N. Y. 247,254, 95 N. B. 719, 721 (Igii); see Stephens v. Board of Education,
79 N. Y. 283, 186, 188 (1879).
16For a different theory of the basis of this rule see Note (29o5) I9 HAItV. L.
REV. 55. It is now generally held and may be considered settled that a pre-
existing debt constitutes a valuable consideration for this purpose. Holly v. Mis-
sionary Society, I8o U. S. 284, 21 Sup. Ct. 395, 45 L. ed. 531 (I9OI); Stephens v.
Board of Education, cited supra note I5; Liberty Trust Co. v. Haggerty, 92 N. J.
Eq. 609, 113 Atl. 596 (1921); af'd., II5 Atl. 926 (1921). Contra: Porter v. Rosen-
man, 74 N. B. 1 io5 (Ind. I9O5), commented (igo5) i9 HARv. L. REV. 55; cf. N. Y.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 25, and see note (1925) 38 HARV. L. REV. 800,
8oi seQ.
171n re Savarino, I F. Supp. 331 (D. C. N. Y. 1932) and cases therein cited;
Roberson v. Ellis, 58 Ore. 219, 227; 114 Pac. 100, 103 (i9II); Hamaker v. Blan-
chard, 90 Pa. St. 377, 35 Am. Rep. 664 (1879); Tancil v. Seaton, 28 Gratt. (Va.)
6o, 26 Am. Rep. 380 (1877); Miller v. Race, cited supra note 12.
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The ancient maxim that money has no earmark must be carefully
limited; itsliteral application caused confusion in early cases of com-
mingling of monies and funds18 and still occasionally springs up to
cause trouble.
Remedies. The character of money as a circulating medium of ex-
change, its passage by delivery from hand to hand, and hence nor-
mally its indistinguishability, was reflected also in the early rule that
the common-law remedies of detinue,19 replevin ° and trover2 l do not
lie for money unless it is specifically identified, "unless in a bag."
There is considerable confusion as to the details and the application of
the rule both in the early and the modem cases, a confusion which has
been added to by the needless iteration of the maxim that money
has no earmark. But it has been continuously held that money may
be a subject of conversion and trover when it can be specifically de-
scribed or identified as a specific chattel, there being nothing in the
nature of money which makes it an improper subject of such an
action22 and some courts are liberal in permitting this action in tort.3
The modem cases turn not so much on the nature of money as on
whether there is a duty on the defendant to return or pay over the
specific money received by him or whether the relation is that merely
18Scott, The Right to Follow Money Wrongfully Mingled withother Money (1913).
27 HARV. L. REV. 125. For an early case see Ward v. Ayre, 21 Bulst. 323, 8oEng
Rep. 1157, Cro. Jac. 366,79 Eng. Rep. 314 (K. B. 1615).
"Co. Lir. 286 b. as quoted in Graves v. Dudley, 2o N. Y. 76, 79 (1859); Banks
v. Whetson, Cro. Eliz. 457, Moore K. B. 394, 78 Eng. Rep. 711 (1596); Bretton v.
Barnett, Owen 86, 76 Eng. Rep. 918 (1599); Clarke's Case, Godb. 210, 78 Eng.
Rep. 128 (1613); Isaack v. Clarke, 2 Bulst. 3o6, Moore K. B. 841, 80 Eng. Rep.
1143 (1615); BL. CoMm. bk. III, c. IX.
"'Graves v. Dudley, 2o N. Y. 76 (1859); Sager v. Blain, 44 N. Y. 445 (1871).
"'Watson v. Smith, Cro. Eliz. 723, 78 Eng. Rep. 957 (16oo); Holiday v. Hicks,
Cro. Eliz. 638, 661, 746, 78 Eng. Rep. 878, 900, 978 (16oi); 27 HALSBURY, LAWS
OF ENGLAND (1913) 888. Contra: Hall v. Dean, Cro. Eliz. 841, 78 Eng. Rep. lo68;
Draycott v. Plot, Cro. Eliz. 818, 78 Eng. Rep. 1045. These seem to have been
cases of bailment. Davies v. Dyer, Aleyn 91, 82 Eng. Rep. 931 (1648) was clearly
so. In Isaack v. Clarke, cited supra note 19, the judges were in disagreement as to
whether trover would lie for money. Coke's view ultimately prevailed. 7 HOLDS-
WORTH, HIST. OF ENG. LAW (1926) 404, 410.
2"Rivers v. Oodskirt, Cro. Eliz. 568, 78 Eng. Rep. 812 (1597); Moody v. Keener,
7 Port. 218 (Ala. 1838); Hazelton v. Locke, 1O4 Me. 164, 71 Atl. 661, 2o L. R. A.
(N. S.) 35 (19o8); Pettola v. Western Workman's Pubg. Co., 113 Wash. 283,
193 Pac. 691, 2o A. L. R. 378 (1920), and cases collated in (1927) 5o A. L. R.
T170.
3B. g. Gordon v. Hostetter, 37 N. Y. 99 (1867); Farrelly v. Hubbard, 148 N. Y.
592, 43 N. E. 65 (1896), and the New York cases generally. See AMES, CASES ON
TRUSTS (2d ed. 1893), 1O n. 2.
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of debtor and creditor.24 This distinction was recognized in very early
times.1
Illegal Money. The courts have had frequent occasion to deal with
money, in current use as a means of exchange and circulating me-
dium, which they have been bound to treat as illegally issued, either
because in violation of general principles of law or of specific statutory
prohibitions or as issued without proper governmental authority. In
the history of money in the United States, three types of such cur-
rency stand out (a) Confederate money; (b) bank notes issued in vio-
lation of statutory requirements; (c) emergency money. 6 With some
slight fluctuation of opinion, the general rule is well established that
bona fide consummated transactions will be upheld, notwithstanding
the illegality or lack of positive authority of the currency which serves
as a medium of exchange or consideration in such transactions.27
The cases dealing with Confederate money are especially instructive
on this and many other phases of monetary legal problems, but space
does not permit a review of them. The paper money issued by the
Confederate States, though not formally made a legal tender, was
the only currency in circulation in many sections. Being issued in aid
of the Rebellion, the courts after the termination of the Civil War,
were obliged to consider this issue of paper money as wholly illegal.2 8
But the question was frequently presented as to what if any effect
should be given to transactions consummated in such illegal currency,
and to debts paid with it, or executory contracts entered into on the
basis of this money. Early decisions in several of the state and lower
federal courts in the South held that no effect whatever could be
2 Hazelton v. Locke and other authorities, supra note 22; Melnick v. Kukla,
228 App. Div. 321,239 N. Y. Supp. I6 (4th Dept. 1930); 2 COOLEY, TORTS (4th ed.
1932) § 330, PP. 495 seg.
"Gamev. Harvie, Yelv. So, 8o Eng. Rep. 36 (16o3).
26E. g. Clearing house certificates in the panics of 1893 and 1907, private token
and scrip or barter money. Whenever the legal monetary system breaks down
or the Government fails to provide adequate currency, emergency money spon-
taneously springs up to such an extent as to refute any exclusivist state theory of
money.
27The rule as to counterfeit or forged money is not in contradiction to the gen-
eral principle. Upon discovery, it ceases to be current. Nevertheless, such money
presents interesting problems. For an extraordinary and instructive case, plumb-
ing the depths of the nature of paper money, see Banco de Portugal v. Waterlow,
[1932] A. C. 452. Commented on at length in KIscH, THE PORTUGUESE BANK
NOTE CASE (1932).
2$Thorington v. Smith, 75 U. S. I, 19 L. ed. 361 (1869); cf. Hoagland v. Post, I
N. J. L. 32 (1790); And see Hale v. Shai p, 44 Tenn. 275, 280 (1867); Houston &
Texas C. R. Co. v. Texas, 177 U. S. 66,90,20 Sup. Ct. 545,554,44 L. ed. 673,685
(Igoe).
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given by the courts to contracts the consideration for which was this
illegal currency. A contract payable in such money it was said was so
tainted with the illegality of its original issue as to render the contract
void.29 In other states, however, this extreme view was not taken and
contracts, the consideration of which was Confederate currency, not
made directly in aid of the Rebellion, were held valid and the decision
of the Supreme Court in Thorington v. Smith" definitely established
the validity of such contracts."' The general principle of the validity
of contracts and payments in Confederate currency notes being thus
established, subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court and of the
state courts were concerned with its detailed application or with
the construction, constitutionality and effect of the Scaling Acts
passed by the states.3 2 These cases are worthy of study in extenso be-
cause they present crucial problems in the theory of money. The
problems were complicated by the fact, in addition to the currency
being necessarily considered illegal, that at best it was subject to
violent fluctuations, that in the later years of the Civil War, it depre-
ciated enormously and finally became utterly worthless. Many of the
cases were in equity and the courts felt empowered to render decision
with due regard to equitable principles rather than on the stricter
prevalent rules of law, in order to mete out what appeared to them as
fair and just. From the mass of decisions and the divergent theories
displayed by the judges, it is not easy to draw many definite con-
clusions, but the following principles may be deduced with reasonable
safety from a review of the cases:
i. Currency, however illegal, if actually used as a circulating me-
dium in a widespread community, will be given the same effect for all
consummated transactions, as lawful money.
2. Executory contracts, based on illegal or depreciated currency so
"Latham v. Clarke, 25 Ark. 574, 585 (1869).
3'75 U. S. I, ig L. ed. 361 (1869).
31ln Hanauer v. Woodruff, 82 U. S. 439,21 L. ed. 224 (1872), the Supreme Court
refused to extend the rule to local state issues, erroneously, it would seem, if the
general principle as to the validity of transactions in illegal currency be sound.
The Hanauer case was followed in Taylor v. Thomas, 89 U. S. 479, 22 L. ed. 789
(1874), but seems inpliedly overruled by Houston & Texas C. R. R. Co. v. Texas,
377 U. S. 66,20 Sup. Ct. 545, 44 L. ed. 673 (1900).32The leading Supreme Court cases are reviewed in Effinger v. Kenney, I15
U. S. 566, 29 L. ed. 495 (1885); New Orleans Waterworks v. Louisiana Sugar Co.,
125 U. S. 18, 31 L. ed. 607 (1888); Baldy v. Hunter, I71 U. S. 388, 43 L. ed. 208
(898). For state court cases, see ii Am. DIG. "Contracts" § 675; and notes 19
L. ed. 362 (I868); (I9OO) 48 L. R.A. 823; (19o3) 58 L.R. A. 183; (1911).31 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 236; (2922) 29 A. L. R. 588; (1929) 6i A. L. R. 739,747; (I93I) 71 A. L. R.
569; Hendry v. Benlisa, 37 Fla. 609, 34 L. R. A. 283 (1896), a belated but un uc-
cessful suit for specific performance.
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circulating, will be enforced to the extent of their just obligations,
and the general principle of law that debts are solvable in the money
which is current or legal tender at the time of payment is subject to
important qualifications and exceptions in order to attain justice
between the parties.
3. Payment of debts and obligations made and received in good
faith in illegal or depreciated currency constitutes a full discharge or
satisfaction of the debts and obligat'o-as.
The principle as to the validity of transactions consummated in
illegal currency is also sustained by cases involving state bank notes,
put out in violation of statutory requirements, which frequently came
before the courts before state bank notes were taxed out of existence.
Such unlawful notes, according to the weight of the decisions,33 were
given full effect, equally with lawful money, as a circulating medium
between third parties, that is where the issuing bank itself was not a
party to the litigation. The leading case is Orchard v. Hughes.34 In
litigation with the bank itself that issued the bank notes illegally,
there was a difference of opinion. Some cases, but not all, held the
bank liable and almost invariably so, if the notes had been transferred
to a bona fide holder for value.35
One final but fundamental consideration must be pointed out.
There is a limit in fact to the power of the State to create fiat money.
The confidence of the people and the cooperation of the trading com-
munity are necessary to complete money. The state can give paper
money or extremely debased coin debt-cancelling power enforceable
by the courts, but the experience of history proves that it is powerless
to enforce it upon the community as a medium of exchange. It can-
not against the general resistance of the people force them to render
services or sell goods for money which the community, through lack
of confidence, will have none of. The classical example is furnished
by the latter days of the assignats and mandats of the French revolu-
tionary period." They ceased to be really money.37
"Cases collated (1929) 48 C. J. 6o8, § 38. Cf. Ontario Bank v. Lightbody, 13
Wend. (N. Y.) ioi (1834). 3168 U. S. 73, 17 L. ed. 560 (1863). '
35Atlas Bank v. Nahant Bank, 44 Mass. 581 (1842); see also Cooke v. U. S.,
91 U. S. 389, 23 L. ed. 237 (1875) (The Government liable for Treasury notes,
circulating as currency, genuinely printed but unlawfully put in circulation). In
Thomas v. Richmond, 79 U. S. 349, 2o L. ed. 453 (1870) the Supreme Court re-
fused to hold the City of Richmond liable on its notes, put out during the Civil
War and freely used as currency, but in violation of statue. But see supra note 31.
36WHITE, FIAT MONEY INFLATION IN FRANCE (933). An instance in our own
history was California's rejection of the greenbacks. I SEDGWICK, DAMAGES (9th
ed. 1912) 537; MosEs, Legal Tender Notesin California (1892) 7 QuART. J. EcON. I.
3TNUSSBAUM, DAS GELD (TEoRIA JURIDICA DEL DINERO) (Sp. ed. 1929) 62, 73.
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MONEY AS MEASURE OF VALUE
In order to serve as a medium of exchange, money must perform
the function of a common measure or standard of value, as it is usually
phrased. This function of money is recognized generally by the courts
in definitions or expositions laid down or adopted by them. It would
avoid confusion of thought, however, if the notion were expressed
by the term common denominator of value.
The perplexities in the minds of the judges arising from the phrases,
occasionally differentiated, "measure of value" or "standard of
value" were brought vividly to light in all the opinions in the Legal
Tender cases,3 8 both those of the majority as well as of the dissenting
judges. The dissenting judges strongly emphasized that as distances
cannot be measured without a unit of extent itself having a certain
definite length, or weights without standards having definite gravity,
so a measure of value must itself have intrinsic value. This they main-
tained, in the light of international requirements, could only be gold
or silver. Even the majority judges were in agreement that money
must possess an intrinsic value in order to serve as a standard of value.
Mr. Justice Strong did adumbrate the more prevalent notion today
when he recognized that "value is an ideal thing", but he did not
follow out the logical consequences of this notion, his opinion and
Bradley's being based on the premise that the Government would
eventually redeem its promise to pay in real money, that is specie.
The view, that only that which has an international value can serve
as a measure of value, has been generally supported by the mer-
cantile community and is the one favored by orthodox economists.
However advisable from an economic viewpoint, its soundness as a
matter of law is open to doubt. On the contrary, the distinction be-
tween the internal value of money and its external value, especially
for purposes of the foreign exchange market, has been recognized
from early times39 and it is consequently the national money, inde-
pendently of its foreign exchange or other intrinsic value, that serves
(except in cases of extreme depreciation) as the common denominator
of value for internal legal purposes.
The same thing happened with the Continental and state paper money of the
Revolutionary period and with many post-war European currencies.
3879 U. S. 457, 20 L. ed., 312, 313, 315, 322-324, 328, 330, 333, 344 (i87I).
"Probably the history of philosophy furnishes no instances of an equally mis-
chievous result from the use of a false terminology than that which has followed
the phrase 'measure of value' in its application to money" 2 PALGRAVE, DICT.
POL. EcoN. (1896) 793.
39MALYNES, LEx MERCATORIA (1684) 213, following Continental jurists.
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The function of serving as a common denominator is much broader
than that of the function of money as a medium of exchange. It is
constantly necessary in daily life, and consequently in law, to set a
pecuniary valuation on tangible and intangible property which does
not enter into exchanges. Property must be assessed for tax purposes
regardless of whether the owner has any intention or possibility of
selling it. Books of account must be kept in money and for accounting
purposes generally, items such as capital assets must have a numeri-
cal monetary valuation, although not intended to enter the field of
commerce. Public utilities must be valued for the purpose of de-
termining the rates which may be charged to the public. Values must
be determined at the expiration of long term leaseholds for the pur-
pose of determining future rentals on renewal options. In the assess-
ment of damages, under condemnation proceedings, for breach of
contract, in actions for torts, a pecuniary valuation has to be made.
Criminal penalties, especially for minor offenses, often take the form
of a money fine. In numerous other instances, it becomes necessary to
translate property or claims into pecuniary values for the purpose of
dealing with them in a practical way.
The law in practice, contrary to the mercantile theory, has in gen-
eral deemed the internal standard money to be, for the purposes of
the law, the only permissible standard; in other words, the courts
usually give consideration only to the nominal value of money as laid
down by legislation. But there have been occasions, in addition to
the frequent dicta, when the courts have adhered to the mercantile
theory and based decisions on the principle of finding the actual value
of money in reference to a specie standard or in reference to the pur-
chasing power of money, disregarding the nominal value given to it
by the legislature. A complete legal theory of money if deemed neces-
sary at all should, it seems, strive to reconcile and embrace in a still
broader concept both these theories. On the one hand it must be
recognized that money is delivered and received even in business
transactions (other than foreign exchange dealings), not for what it
represents in physical gold or silver, but as a fraction, equivalent or
multiple of an ideal unit. The "Value" concepts of money on the other
hand, are derived directly or indirectly from the value of some basic
material (gold or silver in modern times) of which money is assumed
to be representative. Metaphysical abstractions apart, when paper
money is redeemable on demand into specie or when coins of one
metal of an intrinsically lower market value than current coins of an-
other metal, more valuable in the market, are redeemable into coin or
bullion of the latter, this theory, with all its consequences, holds true,
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but it fails when these conditions of convertibility are suspended or
terminated. The concept of money as an ideal unit then necessarily
comes into play. But this concept, expressed by the phrase a "dollar is
always a dollar" should not, by a fiction, be carried to the point of
ruling that the value of a dollar at one time is its value for all times.
The true value of money is not excluded from legal consideration. 41
If the legislature were to lay down a rule in effect that a dollar is
always a dollar, it may be expected that the courts whenever the
necessity for doing justice arises, will construe such legislation very
strictly and hold it within the narrowest possible limits.
Any currency may be a medium of exchange, but it is only the
standard money'that normally serves as a common denominator of
value. When any currency is depreciated in the market relative to the
standard money, a preliminary calculation of its ratio to the standard
money becomes necessary in order to fix prices and determine pay-
ments. Itis the general rule of English and American law, that except
in the rare instances where a court of equity grants the remedy of
specific performance, all damages for breach of contract or of obli-
gations resting in quasi-contract and tort, must be assessed in the
standard money of the country and judgments can only be rendered
in such standard money. Since i792, 41 that has meant in the United
States that judgments must be entered in dollars and cents. Conse-
quently, it is erroneous to enter a judgment in foreign money.42 In an
action on an obligation in foreign currency, the judgment should be
entered for its value in domestic money.41 On obligations payable in
state bank notes, the judgment had to be in the standard money."
Depreciated bank notes were not considered an ultimate standard of
40NUSSBAUM, op. cit. supra note 37.
4tDuring the transition period after the adoption of the dollar as the monetary
unit, but before its use became general, judgments were frequently rendered in
pounds, shillings and pence, and such judgments were upheld, e. g. Telfair v.
Stead, 6 U. S. 407, 2 L. ed. 320 (18o4), despite the express language of the Act of
April 2, 1792 (R. S. 3563, 31 U. S. C. A. § 371), "The money of account of the
United States shall be expressed in dollars or units ...... and all proceedings in
the courts shall be kept and had in conformity to this regulation."
4Frontera Transportation Co. v. Abaunza, 271 Fed. 199 (C. C. A. 5th, 1921);
The Edith, Fed. Cas. No. 4281 (1871); SEDGWIcK, DAMAGES (9th ed. 1912) § 273;
1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) § 91. On the Continent, judgments in
many countries may be entered for foreign money. NusSn3AUu, LA CLAUSE-OR
DANS LES CONTRATS INTERNATIONAUX (1934) 79. And semble, a declaratory judg-
ment with us might be entered with reference to foreign money.
43Liberty National Bank v. Burr, 27o Fed. 251 (D. C. Pa. 1921); FREEMAN, Op.
ct. supra note 42.
'"Cases collated in (1924) 33 C. J. 1207, note 87 (d).
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value, but their actual market value was frequently taken into con-
sideration by the courts.45 The same rule applies to contracts dis-
chargeable in goods, even gold: the judgment must be for the value
of the gold in money.46
In the years following the Civil War, when there were two author-
ized currencies, gold and silver coin on the one hand, and depreciated
legal tender notes (green backs) of fluctuating value in terms of gold,
it was generally held that in the absence of a contract expressly stipu-
lating for payment in coin, or of statutory authority in the case of
torts, judgments should be entered generally for dollars and that a
judgment for coined dollars or gold was erroneous. But contracts call-
ing for payment in gold and silver coin were enforced, judgments being
rendered either in gold dollars or in the equivalent in dollars generally
of the gold value. The subject tas been so ably and fully discussed
recently4 7 that it is unnecessaryi here to give it consideration, other
than to point out that the wavering views of the Supreme Court
judges as to whether the gold clause imported a commodity or was a
debt, would have been avoided had they recognized the true character
of the gold clause, as pointed out in recent decisions, viz: that it fixes
a standard of value.48
FLUCTUATING VALUE OF THE STANDARD MONEY
It is not merely in cases where there are two currencies simultane-
ously in circulation, one of which is depreciated in value in respect
to the other, that the courts have to take into consideration the fact
that the value of money itself changes. This fact, in the forefront
today in economic and political controversies, is constantly brought
to the attention of the courts and for the first time in our history, we
believe, has in the recent monetary legislation been expressly referred
to in currency statutes. In view of the current trend of economic dis-
cussions, seeking methods to stabilize the value of money, it is likely
in the future that the courts will more and more be asked, in order to
arrive at the proper interpretation of currency legislation, to con-
4Robinson v. Nobles, 33 U. S. i81, 8 L. ed. 9IO (1834); Boswell v. Clarksons,
24 Ky. 48 (1829); Gamble v. Hatton, 7 Tenn. 13o (1823); Edmunds v. Digges,42
Va. 359, 549, 42 Am. Dec. 561 (1845); and see State v. McFetridge, 84 Wisc.
473, 513, 54 N. W. I, 1o (1893).46See Betts v. Butler, i Idaho x85, 188 (1868).
47Nebolsine, The Gold Clause in Private Contracts (1933) 42 YALE L. J. io5i;
Note (1933) 84 A. L. R. 1499.
4 8Serbian & Brazilian cases, Permanent Court of International Justice, July 12,
1929. Judgments Nos. 14, I5, Series A/B Nos. 34, 35, Series A. No. 20/21; reason-
ing followed by the unanimous opinion of the House of Lords in Feist v. Socidtd
Intercommunale, [I934] A. C. 16I, 28 Am. J. oF INT. LAW 374 (1934).
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sider mooted economic theories as to the relation between money
and prices.
Heretofore the courts have had no occasion to consider these
theories. The general fact that changes have occurred in the price-
level has been sufficient for the work they have had to do. Some dicta
are to be found it is true in which it is implied that the courts can-
not consider the fluctuating value of money. The most notable of
these dicta is that of Mr. Justice Holmes in Deutsche Bank v. Hum-
Phrey:40 "Obviously in fact a dollar or a mark may have different
values at different times but to the law that establishes it it is always
the same."
Nevertheless, in concrete cases, the courts decline to carry out the
doctrine that to the law that establishes it, the dollar is always
the same. The courts can and do take judicial notice of the purchasing
power of money, of a general rise or fall of prices and of the conse-
quent loss or augmentation of the purchasing power of the dollar, 0
especially in questions of damages." The subject has been most fre-
quently discussed in personal injury cases. In a number of these
cases, the discussion as to the value of money may be irrelevant; in a
few, owing to instructions given to the jury or other special reasons,
the point would seem to be directly involved. In' one of the leading
cases5 2 holding that the jury could consider the then impaired purchas-
ing power of the dollar, a dissenting opinion by Judge Watson upheld
the conception that a dollar is always a dollar. His argument cannot
be dismissed as merely a verbal quibble as to what is the value of
money. He is right to the extent that there is no logical distinction
to be drawn between debt and tort cases. In strict logic, the rule
should be the same. Practical considerations however and the puni-
tive ideas that remain as a relic from early law in the treatment of
torts, have established a different rule. In tort cases,51 in equity,5 in
4'272 U. S. 517, 519, 71 L. ed. 383, 385 (1926). This dictum was cited with ap-
provalin Matter of James, 248 N. Y. 1, 6, 16r N. E. 201,202 (1928).
5OLos Angeles G. & E. Corp. v. Railroad Commission, 289 U. S. 287, 3o8, 311,
77 L. ed. ni8o, II94, 1196 (1933); Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Elvins, 176 Ark. 737,4
S. W. (2d) 528 (1928); Stromerv. Dupont, I5O So. 32 (La. 1933).
5tCases collated and discussed in notes (1919) 3 A. L. R. 61o, (1921) 1O A. L. R.
179, (1922) 18 A. L. R. 564, (1929) 6o A. L. R. 1395.
52Halloran v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 95 Vt. 273, 115 Atl. I43, 18 A. L. R.
554 (1921); and see Note (1922) 35 HARV. L. REv. 616.
nThe Telegraph and Vaughan 81 U. S. 258, 20 L. ed. 807 (1871); Simpkins v.
Low, 54 N. Y. 179 (1873); Clarke v. Nevada Land & Mining Co., 6 Nev. 203
(1871); See Note (1921) 34 HARV. L. REv. 422.
"Willard v. Tayloe, 75 U. S. 557, 19 L. ed. 5Ol (1870); Deering v. Parker, 4
Dallas (Pa) xxiii (P. C. 176o) (opinion by Lord Mansfield); Wharton v. Morris, I
Dallas (Pa) 124 (1785).
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quasi-contracts, 55 and perhaps in contracts other than for pecuniary
debts,56 the courts are free from the restrictions imposed by statutes
enacting a legal tender for debts. The essential principles which
should guide the courts seem to have been well laid down in the case
of Hurst v. Chicago B. Q. R. Co.57
The subject of the fluctuating value of money has been discussed
also in valuation and rate cases.5 There are many other fields where
the discussion would be pertinent, but there has been little case-law
on the subject heretofore. With the definite, mathematically calcul-
able, devaluation of the dollar under Act of Congress and Presidential
Proclamation, it can be expected that the subject will loom large in
future litigation. When fair compensation is to be awarded, no legis-
lative magic can blind the courts to the fact that ioo of the present
dollars are the equivalent of only 59.o6 of the former dollars., 9
The present meaning and extent of the power of Congress to "regu-
late the value" of money 0 has never been adequately discussed. Does
it mean any more than the common law prerogative of the Sovereign
to set the denominations at which money shall pass current and be a
'5i SUTHERLAND, DAMAGES (4th ed. 1916) 603, 604.
56 impkins v. Low, 54 N. Y. 179 (1873); I SUTHERLAND, ante note 55.
6728o Mo. 566, 219 S. W. 566, io A. L. R. I79 (1920) ("The dollar is at best
merely a unit for the measurement of values. It is a fluctuating and variable
criterion and therefore an imperfect one .... when radical, material and ap-
parently permanent changes in social and economic conditions confront mankind,
courts must take cognizance of them-not too hastily, lest that which seems to be
permanent should prove to be transient, nor yet too tardily lest justice fail. The
humane and just intent of the law is at all times to afford fair compensation to one
who has suffered wrong. Compensation means compensation in value. It will not
do to say that the same amount of money affords the same compensation when
money is cheap as when money is dear. The value of money lies not in what it is,
but in what it will buy.")
5 Notably.in the O'Fallon case, 124 I. C. C. 3, 30, 34 seq., 41, 53 seq., 59 seq.
(1927); St. Louis & O'Fallon R. R. Co. v. U. S., 279 U. S. 461, 49 Sup. Ct. 461, 73
L. ed. 798, 8io, 815 (1929); Strawn, Monetary Stabilization and the Law (1929) 14
IowA L. Rtv. 42o; Matthews, Supreme Court Decisions on Reproduction Costs
(1924)37 HARv. L. REv. 436.
69The Telegraph and Vaughan, 81 U. S. 258, 2o L. ed. 807 (1871) (In assessing
damages, jury may take into consideration the fact judgment can be paid in legal
tender notes).
60U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 8. Nor has the power of congress to regulate the value of
foreign money. Ibid.Foreign coin probably must be understood in the light of the
Legal Tender cases to include foreign money in any form, not only currency, but
bills of exchange and cable transfers. See 31 U. S. C. A. § 372 (1927). Has Congress
the constitutional power (subject of course to contest in international courts) to
decree, by "regulating" the value of the pound at, say, one dollar, that an Ameri-
can debtor may satisfy a debt of £iooo by payment of $iooo?
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legal tender?6' If the courts once admit that Congress has the power
to enact into legislation any of the diverse quantity theories of money,
it would follow not merely that Congress has the right, which it has
heretofore exercised and which seems undoubted, to regulate directly
or indirectly through the monetary authorities, the volume of cur-
rency and of bank or deposit money, but that it equally has the power
to regulate another factor involved in any quantity theory, namely,
the volume of goods. If so, there would seem to be no constitutional
limit whatsoever to the exercise by Congress of complete control over
the whole economic field of production, distribution and consumption
of wealth. A conclusion so shocking to our present democratic stand-
ards may well make us pause before taking the initial plunge into a
sweeping torrent. State rights would vanish even more rapidly than
they have been vanishing. Once saddled with the quantity theory of
money, it could scarcely be denied that full control over the volume
of goods, at any stage in the economic process, was an appropriate
means, plainly adapted to the end 2 of regulating the value of money.
Could Congress, without constitutional amendment, entirely
abolish money as we now know it and substitute some scheme that
happened to gain temporary popularity, of the many that have been
proposed from time to time to replace money, such as coupon-books
with an elaborate system of accounting and clearing houses, or a vast
extension of the check system, without reference to a metallic or other
tangible base, or "social credit", or so-called free money constantly
diminishing in value if unspent, etc.? It goes without saying that vast
legal difficulties would be created by such revolutionary change. On
the other hand, the problems involved by a uniform international
currency, on a metallic base, would appear to be political and practi-
cal rather than legal or constitutional in nature.
Another phase of the constitutional power of Congress to regulate
the value of money also seems to have been heretofore not discussed.
Can Congress, as it has attempted to do in part in the Joint Reso-
lution of June 5, 1933, prohibit parties to private contracts from
setting up their own standards of value for the measurement of their
obligations? It has constantly been stated on the authority of the
language in the case itself, that Bronson v. Rodes 3 involved no consti-
61Le Case de Mixt Moneys, cited supra note 8; HALE, P. C. 194; 1 BL. COMM.
(14th Eng. ed.) 277, 278. See Smith, The National Industrial Recovery Act (1934)
20 A. B. A. J. 275, 276.
6
,
2McCulochv. Maryland, 17 U. S. 316,421, 4L. ed. 579,605 (1819).
6374 U.S. 229, 19 L. ed. 141 (1869) (upholding the gold clause); reaff'd, after the
Legal Tender decisions, by Trebilcock v. Wilson, 79 U. S. 687, 20 L. ed. 460(I872),
and subsequent cases. The rule of Bronson v. Rodes does not always work to
favor the creditor. Johnson v. Ash, I42 Pa. 45,21 Atl. 754 (1891).
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tutional question. But a constitutional question was really implicit
in the decision. The case in fact upholds the freedom of contract be-
tween parties, to determine, as between themselves, a standard of
value, notwithstanding legislative fiat creating another standard
of value, paper instead of gold and silver. It seems to imply that the
power of Congress over money is -not plenary"-Congress may create
a new medium of exchange, it may decree that such new medium of
exchange shall be a legal tender even for pre-existing currency debts,
but this power of Congress does not extend to abrogate the freedom
of contracting parties to determine, for their transactions, a stand-
ard of value other than the statutory dollar; that the determination of
an absolute standard of value, which cannot be departed from in
private contracts, is not a necessary part of the currency power, is not
an appropriate means, plainly adapted to a legitimate end. On no
other theory can the case be understood or Mr. Justice Miller's dis-
senting arguments be adequately met. Either Bronson v. Rodes was
wrong, or if it is to be upheld, it follows that Congress has no such
power as that embodied in the declaration of the Joint Resolution of
June 5, 1933, in effect that aclause in a contract calling for a different
measure of value than the paper dollar shall be void. This is a totally
different matter to that of declaring a legal tender for debts. If in
order to regulate, or under the pretext of regulating, the value of
money and as an appropriate means to that end, Congress may pro-
hibit reference to gold or other metal as a standard of value, may it
not also prohibit reference to other commodities or measures? And
still further, under the combined authority of its power to declare a
legal tender and to regulate measures of value, order a contract for
the delivery of wheat to be satisfied by the delivery of corn or iron
or feathers. This the Supreme Court once said Congress could not do.
Will it say it again?
MONEY AS MEDIUM OF PAYMENT
The courts have almost invariably treated the function of money
as a medium of payment as a separate and distinct function, although
some economists are inclined to treat it as merely a special and ex-
tended instance of its function as a medium of exchange. Many courts
indeed have gone to the extent of saying that only that is money
"And see Lane v. Oregon, 74 U. S. 71, 19 L. ed. ioI (1868) (The prohibition
against the states to make anything but gold and silver a legal tender implies that
they may constitutionally decree that taxes due them shall be paid in gold or
silver.)
"Legal Tender Cases, 79 U. S. 549,'566, 20 L. ed. 311, 317 (1871).
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which is made by law a legal tender, but this doctrine is clearly erron-
eous and will not bear critical analysis.66 Such a doctrine is in conflict
with daily usage. By far the greater number of payments are made by
check and, if important, by certified or cashier's check. The strict
rules of tender are waived, effectively, by the creditor. Around this
practice, much law has been built up, which calls for no special com-
ment. No comprehensive legal theory of money accordingly can
ignore bank or deposit money, which outranks currency in the pro-
portion of approximately 8 to i in the nation's monetary stock and at
least 20 to i in the nation's business turnover. The important thing
to note is that money serves as a medium of discharge of obligations
either by usage, historically the older, or by declaration of statute as
legal tender.
Judges who adopt the theory that the only true money is that
based on or representative of metal, are inclined to the view that gold
and silver coins are by the common law a legal tender to the amount
of their respective denominations for all contracts or payments pay-
able in money, without any legislative enactment to make them so;
and that the provisions in coinage Acts that the coins to be struck
shall be such legal tender are merely declaratory of their effect when
offered in payment and are not essential, although expedient, to give
them that character.6 7 The history of English legislation and the early
decisions tend to confirm this view.6 8 However this may be, it is clear
that as to other kinds of money, that is paper-money of any kind,
commodities (frequently in colonial days made a legal tender), foreign
coins and possibly in the not distant future, bank money, affirmative
statutory action is required. Such statutes being in derogation of the
common law are strictly construed. 69
In the absence of express stipulation in contracts providing for a
specific coin or currency or standard of value, it is well settled that the
obligation of a contract to pay money generally is to pay that which
660liphant, supra note 2, at 608 seg.67E. g. Field & Clifford in Legal Tender Cases, 79 U. S. 457, 2o L. ed. 287, at pp.
326, 344.
68Lord Holt in Dixon v. Willoughs (Willows), Holt K. B. 471, 9o Eng. Rep.
116o; 2 Salkeld 446, 9I Eng. Rep. 387; 3 Salkeld 239, 91 Eng. Rep. 8oo (1696);
BRECKINRIDGE, LEGAL TENDER (1903).
69Bronson v. Rodes, 74 U. S. 229, 19 L. ed. i41 (1869); Lane v. Oregon, 74 U. S.
71, i9 L. ed. ioi (1869); Hagar v. Reclamation Dist., III U. S. 701, 4 Sup. Ct.
663, 28 L. ed. 569 (1884); Phila. & R. R. Co. v. Morrison, Fed. Cas. No. n1,o89
(C. C. Pa. 1864); Clarke v. Nevada Land & Mining Co., 6 Nev. 203 (187); Shot-
well's Exec. v. Denham, i N. J. L. 174 (1793); Grigby v. Oakes, 2 Bos. & Pul. 526,
126 Eng. Rep. 142o (i8oi); Feist v. Soci6t6 Intercommunale, ['9341 A. C. i61.
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the law shall recognize as money when the payment is to be made.70
And for this purpose, one lawful money is as good as another; the
debtor can take his choice indiscriminately. Alia pro alia solvitur.
This ties in with the rule as to the indistinguishability of money dis
cussed above under the heading of medium of exchange. The legal
difficulties arise when the creditor has endeavored to protect himself
by safeguards against depreciation or devaluation of the currency.
These safeguards, almost as ancient as money itself, take various
forms. The most frequent in this country have been gold, gold coin or
other specie clauses. On the Continent and, to a lesser extent in bond
issues in the United States, foreign exchange clauses or options have
been frequently resorted to. Payment in, or measurement by, com-
modities has not been uncommon and has a long and honorable lin-
eage in certain classes of contracts, especially farmleases. It is in this
field of attempted safeguards that the clash of opposing theories has
been most marked, and has found its concrete application in the inter-
pretation of currency statutes. Long prior to definitive statutory
enactments, the distinction between money of account and current
money was developed. Our dollar at its inception was merely a money
of account.7' The distinction is revived by the recent legislation.7
It is practically acted on in the modern world of inconvertible paper
monies, by reference to the universal medium, gold. Hence the efforts
of even nations which are on an inconvertible paper basis to build up
their gold stocks, sterile as far as internal transactions are concerned.
70Legal Tender Cases, 79 U. S. 548, 20 L. ed. 311 (1870); Juilliard v. Greenman,
1xo U. S. 421, 28 L. ed. 204, 215 (1884); Reinback v. Crabtree, 77 111. 182 (1875);
Poug v. de Lindsay, i Dyer 82a, 73 Eng. Rep. 178 (1552) and note i Dyer 82 b,
73 Eng. Rep. 179, where the distinction is suggested between a debtor tendering
debased money at maturity and a debtor in default who cannot take advantage of
devaluation. Le Case de Mixt Moneys, cited supra note 8. The distinction, which
would seem to be reasonable, made also in that case and in HALE, P. C. 193, be-
tween payment at maturity and payment after default, seems generally to have
been lost sight of. I SUTHERLAND op. cit. supra note 55, at 618. In the latter case,
it might well beheld, enlarging on what Hale says ("but if the day had been passed
before the proclamation, then he must have answered the value as it was when
payment was to have been made") that the creditor is entitled to fair compen-
sation for depreciation of the currency, and not merely interest. It is so held by
some Continental authorities, and it was so held in cases dealing with promises to
pay in state bank notes. See Moore v. Clines, 247 Ky. 605, 57 S. W. (2d) 509
(1933). There is a case involving devaluation as early as 1300. 23 SELDEN SO-
CrETY, I SELECT CASES ON THE LAW MERCHANT (1908) 80.7
nCoINAGE ACT April 2, 1792, ch. 6, § 20; 1 STAT. 250. Clifford, J. in Legal
Tender Cases, 20 L. ed. 326 (1870).
72The new gold dollar of fifteen 15/2i grains is not coinable. GOLD RESERVE
ACT Of Jan. 30, 1934, § 5; 48 STAT. 340.
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The distinction between the internal or local value of money and its
external or foreign exchange value is more sharply accentuated today
than ever before in history. Gold, as the sole medium of settling inter-
national balances resulting from the flow of goods, services and
credits, remains the ultimate factor in foreign exchange rates. It
might be called the international money of account and the only
international legal tender. Currency wars, no new phenomenon,73
center on gold.
The importance in the economic field of the foreign exchange value
of a country's currency, and the reciprocal value of foreign money in
terms of a nation's domestic money, finds its reflection in the rapidly
growing volume of decisions as to damages in fluctuating exchanges
and as to conflict of laws. In no field of monetary law does greater
confusion reign. Equally with the saying that "money has no ear-
mark", the phrase "foreign money is a commodity" has been used as
a shortcut to decisions, befuddling rather than helping to elucidate
the problems. Mercantile circles recognize of course that exchange
rates fluctuate, just as the general community recognizes that the pur-
chasing power of domestic money fluctuates. But otherwise the mer-
cantile community does not see any fundamental difference between
foreign money and domestic money. It does not treat foreign money as
a commodity. One regards a deposit in a London bank substantially
in the same light as a deposit in a New York bank. So the courts in
crucial cases, where the measure of damages is not involved, treat
foreign money as substantially alike with domestic money74 and do
not resort to the stock phrase that foreign money is a commodity.
Similarly a contract to pay foreign money, or a breach of duty in tort
or quasi-contract resulting in an obligation to pay foreign money,
should be treated on the same footing as an obligation concerned with
domestic money and the same rules as to damages applied, viz: that
the date of breach should normally fix the time for assessing dam-
ages.7 5 The date of judgment rule76 is more open to practical ob-
73Edward III and Henry VIII engaged in currency wars. Sir Thomas Gresham
was in charge of an Exchange Stabilization Fund in 1552. FEAVERYEAR, op. cit.
supra note 9, at i5, 69; MALYNES, Op. cit. supra note 39, at 214.
74Tsivoglou v. U. S., 31 F. (2d) 7o6 (C. C. A. Ist, 1929); Brown v. Perera, 182
App. Div. 922, 176 N. Y. Supp. 215 (ist Dept. i918); cf. Reisenfeld v. Jacobs,
107 Misc. I, 176 N. Y. Supp. 223 (I919); and see SUTHERLAND, DAMAGES (4th
ed. 1916) § 205, p. 594; BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (5th ed. 3932)
i6I ; King v. Hamilton, 12 Fed. 478,48o (C. C. Ore. 1882).
75DicEy, CONFLICT OF LAWS (5th ed. 1932) 728; Parker v. Hoppe, 257 N. Y.
333, 178 N. E. 550 (1931), and Note (1932) 45 HARv. L. REv. 1119.
76Deutsche Bank v. Humphrey, 272 U. S. 517, 71 L. ed. 383 (1926); NUSSBAUMf,
op. cit. supra note 42, at 87, points out the opinion proceeded on wrong assump-
tions as to the German law.
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jections as well as being in conflict with the general principles re-
lating to damages." When its application results, as it frequently
does, in the plaintiff not receiving the reparation to which he is justly
entitled, it would seem to be unsound. Only when it is applied so as to
put the claimant back in as good a position as he was in before, would
it seem to have any justification. Then an analogous rule to that
applied by the courts in personal injury cases in which the fluctuating
purchasing power of money is taken into consideration, would not
seem improper. But in no event would the dictum that foreign money
is a commodity seem to have any place in a critical discussion.
RECENT LEGISLATION
Leaving aside the strictly emergency proclamation of the President,
March 5, 1933, and the National Banking Emergency Relief Act78
giving the President powers over the currency not only in time of war,
but also during "any other period of national emergency", and the
regulations as to gold hoarding, gold export and foreign exchange,
the new currency legislation comprises the Thomas amendment
to the Emergency Farm Relief and Price Inflation Act,79 the Joint
Resolution of June 5, 1933,' the Banking Act of June i6, 1933,81 the
Gold Reserve Act of January 30, 1934,2 the Presidential Proclam-
ation" reducing the content of the gold dollar to 59.o6% of its former
gold content, and the Silver Purchase Act of 19344 and Executive
order thereunder "nationalizing" silver. The authority of the Presi-
dent is not exhausted by the proclamation of devaluation; further
action is possible.8 The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act"
of June 16, 3933, also may have influence on the future of monetary
theory. In line with the tendency to assimilate bank money to cur-
rency, the next logical step flowing from the guaranty of bank de-
posits under Government auspices, would be to make cashiers' or
certified checks a legal tender.
It is not our purpose to discuss here the constitutionality of these
measures. The Gold Reserve Act, clearly unconstitutional8 7 on the
770n the general subject see Note (1927) 4o HARV. L. REV. 621, expressing a
contrary view, founded on an underlying theory of conflict of laws and authorities
therein cited; and Note (930) 43 HARV. L. REV. 1307.
7848 STAT. 2. 7948 STAT. 52.
8048 STAT. 113. 8148 STAT. 162. 8248 STAT. 337.
S3Jan. 3, 1934, No. 2072; 31 U. S. C. A. § 821 (May 1934) Cum. Pamph. 242.
84june i9, 1934; 31 U. S. C. A. s. (July 1934) Cum. Pamph. 267 seg.
85GoLD RESERVE ACT sect. 12, and express reservation in the Proclamation.
8848 STAT. 168.87Monongahela Co. v. U. S., x48 U. S. 3 2, 37 L. ed. 463 (1893); National City
Bank v. U. S., 275 Fed. 855, 859 seg. (D. C. N. Y. 1921), aff'd. 281 Fed. 754 (C.
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point that the just compensation to be paid for the gold taken over
by the Treasury was fixed by Congress and the Executive and not by
the courts, has been acquiesced in, on the practical ground that if
there was to be a paper profit resulting from devaluation, it should
enure to the Government and not to the private bank stockholders
of the Federal Reserve Banks. Strong practical arguments have also
been urged in support of the nullification of prior gold contracts. 8
Our purpose is to point out, apart from constitutional questions, and
in addition to the fact already alluded to that the Joint Resolution
and the Thomas Amendment in effect enact the quantity theory of
money and confuse the different functions of money, that these new
enactments do not form a body of legislation consistent with itself s9
or with such parts of prior statutes0 as are not repealed. Neither do
they lay down rules sufficiently definite adequately to guide the courts
in the solution of problems, apart from constitutional questions, that
are bound to be presented if the legislation continues to be upheld.
Where does this legislation leave monetary theory? All currency
statutes are to be construed together." We then have a situation
where the new gold dollar is, in contemplation of law and by statutory
declaration, the standard unit of value, though no such dollar has
been or can be coined and hence is merely a money of account and
not a medium of exchange; where no gold is obtainable even for export
settlement of balances except by the Government itself or at its ar-
bitrary discretion; where the old gold coin, not having been demon-
etized or "decried", 92 as the old common-law called it, and gold cer-
tificates are still a legal tender concurrently with, but at the same
C. A. 2d, 1922); Dexter & Carpenter v. Davis, 281 Fed. 385 (C. C. A. Md. 1922).
The same objection applies to the Treasury Orders of Dec. 28, 1933 and January
15, 1934.
8 Faris, J. in Re Missouri Pacific R. Co., 7 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D. C. Mo. 1934);
Leffingwell, The Gold Problem and Currency Revaluation (1934) 16 ACAD. OF POL.
SCI. PROC. 69.
89Nor are even the isolated statutes self-consistent. PAsvoLsxY, CURRENT MON-
ETARY IssuEs (1933), 48, 49. See Payne, The Gold Clause (May 1934) 2o A. B. A.
J. 370 as to whether the Joint Resolution of June 5, 1933, has been repealed by the
GOLD RESERVE ACT Of 1934.
9SEspecially PARITY ACT March 14, 1900, 31 STAT. 45, 31 U. S. C. A. § 314
(1927); ACT of Dec. 24, 1919, 41 STAT. 370, 31 U. S. C. A. § 451 (1927); R. S.
§ 3563, 31 U. S. C. A. § 371 (1927) (from ACT April 2, 1792, I Stat. 250); THE
SILVER ACT Feb. 28, 1878, 20 STAT. 25.
91Bronsonv. Rodes, 74U. S. 229, 252, 19 L. ed. 141, 147 (1869).
9'The Joint Resolution of June 5, 1933, expressly recognizes gold coins as legal
tender. Sect. 5 of the GOLD RESERVE ACT of 1934, providing "all gold coin of the
United States shall be withdrawn from circulation" would seem to be merely a
direction to the Treasury.
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rate as the new gold dollar of account and the paper dollar, although
holding them is a penal offense; where the present and future status
in our legal system of gold certificates 3 and silver and silver certifi-
cates, the issue of which bids fair to be greatly increased, is fraught
with uncertainty; where the obligation of the government to ulti
mately redeem its currencies in gold coin remains unimpaired;4
where private agreements using gold or silver as a measure of value
are declared illegal95 but commodities or foreign money may law-
fully serve as a private standard of value.91
Moreover the legislation would not seem applicable to private inter-
national transactions. The fundamental purpose was two-fold: (i) to
relieve debtors; (2) to raise prices (the President's intention to move
in the direction of a managed currency, understood as meaning a com-
modity or price-index dollar, is not reflected in the legislation). Obvi-
ously, Congress is not concerned to relieve foreign, but ofnly domestic,
debtors; and under the quantity theory of money, a greater not a lesser
inflow of money from foreign debtors is required to help an upward
trend of prices. Legal tender statutes are strictly construed97 and
currency statutes, like all legislation,9" are presumptively territorial.9
9 3
"Can judicial sanction be given to the proposition that the government may
discharge its obligation to the depositors of bullion by tendering them a number
of note dollars equal to the number of gold or silver dollars which it has contracted
by law to pay?" Bronson v. Rodes, 74 U. S. 229, 19 L. ed. 141, at 147. Gold cer-
tificates are still held by the Federal Reserve Banks.
4The Joint Resolution expressly excludes "currency" from the obligations of
the United States to which it is applicable. Section io of the SILVER PURCHASE
ACT of 1934, implies that part of the gold owned by the United States is "held as a
reserve or as security" for part of the "outstanding currency of the United States."
See Legal Tender Cases, supra note 38, and N.Y. ex rel Bank of N.Y. vs. Super-
visors, N. Y. County, 74 U. S. 26,28, I9 L. ed. 6o, 6i (1869), decided expressly on
the ground that the United States note or greenback was a promise to pay coined
dollars. The obligation resting on the Secretary of the Treasury to maintain the
currency at a parity with the gold dollar (R. S. 3699, PARITY ACT March i4, 1900,
GOLD RESERVE ACT of 1934, §6, 8, 9, 15) does not now make sense.
15joint Resolution of June 5, 1933.
96Stranaghan v. Youmans, 65 Barb. (N. Y.) 392 (1872). A commodity standard
would render an instrument uncertain and hence not negotiable, but not so a
foreign money provision.
97Note 69 supra.
98The Apollon, 22 U. S. 362,6 L. ed. I I I (1824); American Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co., 213 U. S. 347, 357, 53 L. ed. 826, 832, 29 Sup. Ct. 511, 512-13 (1909);
Sandberg v. McDonald, 248 U. S. i85, 195, 39 Sup. Ct. 84, 86, 63 L. ed. 200, 204
(i918); New York Central v. Chisolm, 268 U. S. 29, 31, 32, 45 Sup. Ct. 402, 69 L.
ed. 828, 832 (1925).
"
9Page v. Pendleton, Wythe (Va.) 177 (Minor's ed. 211) (I793); 12 Ops. Att'y.
Gen. 9 (1866); Du Costa and Cole, I Skinner 272, 9o Eng. Rep. 123 (1688). See
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Hence the gold clause nullification Resolution should not be con-
strued to govern, even indirectly, the amount of an indebtedness by a
foreign debtor, even though it determines the medium in which such
amount of indebtedness, once ascertained, is to be payable if payable
in this country. On the other hand, this Resolution being limited in
its language0 0 to obligations payable in dollars and by the rule that it
has no extra-territorial effect, does not serve to relieve American
debtors who have contracted to pay foreign money abroad. The dis-
tinction between American holders and foreign holders, made by some
corporations who have floated bond issues abroad, or at home with
unquestionable options in the bondholder to receive payment abroad
in foreign money, would seem to have no more justification in law'01
than in morals.
Finally there is no clue to be found in the new legislation as to the
treatment, other than for legal tender purposes, to be accorded
the new standard of value in the multitude of cases where com-
parison with the old unit is inevitable. Too great a burden is thrust
on the courts to thrash out these problems in their efforts to do equity
and yet conform to the statutes. The interpretation of these statutes
becomes mere guess work as to the intention of the legislature.
The Bar we cbnceive does not perform its full duty to the com-
munity by discussing merely constitutional questions. Legislation
may well be constitutional and yet violate sound and accepted prin-
ciples of law. The traditions of the common law should be no empty
phrase. In so far as the common law has been the nursery of liberty
in its stand against encroachments and abuse of sovereign power
and in its maintenance of justice and of the principle that the welfare
of the community is best served by upholding the sanctity of con-
tracts in commercial dealings, its fundamental principles can be prop-
erly invoked to serve a useful and patriotic purpose. Currency legis-
lation, warping every fibre of the legal texture and affecting the life of
U. S. v. Erie R. R. Co., io6 U. S. 327, 27 L. ed. I5I (1882). Place of payment
creates only a presumption as to the intention of the parties: the intention of the
parties is primarily determinative. Searight v. Calbraith, 4 U. S. 325, 1. L. ed. 853
(C. C. Pa. 1796); Levy v. Cleveland C. C. & St. Louis R. Co., 21o App. Div. 422,
2o6 N. Y. Supp. 261 (Ist Dept. 1924), rev'g. on this point 121 Misc. 681,202 N. Y.
Supp. 396 (1923).
100",. . as used in this section, the term 'obligation' means an 'obligation...
payable in money of the United States."
110 Levy v. Cleveland C.:C. & St. Louis R. R. Co., 121 Misc. 681, 202 N.Y. Supp.
396 (1923); reV'd. 21o App. Div. 422, 2o6 N. Y. Supp. 261 (1st Dept. 1924), as to
the interpretation of the word "francs", and holding in the particular case the
option was merely as to place of payment; and Note (1924) 37 HARV. L. REv.
1132.
76 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
every citizen in innumerable directions, should especially be subject
to critical analysis on legal, and not merely constitutional, grounds.
Hence we may well ask, apart from constitutional principles, whether
unbridled monetary inflation will not produce disastrous legal as well
as economic effects; whether an inhibition on the citizen from setting
up his own measures of value is sound in principle; whether devalu-
ation, without a definite code so regulating its effects as to minimize
litigation, is wise legislation; whether, in short, a thorough well-
studied revision of all this emergency legislation is not called for at the
earliest possible moment.
